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EXPLAINING COOPERATION OVER CONSTITUENCY CASEWORK BETWEEN 






‘People still come to me in large numbers with various problems’, long-serving Labour MP 
Ann Clwyd points out. ‘Sometimes these are problems that ought to be dealt with by the 
Councillors or the AM. It is difficult to turn a constituent away, although I do try to channel 
them to the appropriate elected member’ (Bratberg, 2011, p. 470). Dealing with the problems 
of individual constituents has long been a central component of political representation (Eulau 
and Karps, 1977). Individuals and groups across the globe seek assistance in their dealings with 
public agencies, and elected representatives across a wide variety of cultures and institutions 
try to help them (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1988; Cain et al., 1987). Representatives devote 
a significant and increasing share of their time to constituency casework (Norton and Wood, 
1993). But little is known about how representatives respond to misdirected constituent 
inquiries in the context of multiple levels of elected government, even though legislative and/or 
executive competences for public policy are divided or shared between regional and central 
governments in a growing number of democracies.  
 
Constituents frequently do not know who deals with what and misdirect their queries. In a recent 
survey MPs in the UK Parliament estimated that more than half of the queries they receive are 
better dealt with by the local council or the devolved assemblies (Russell and Bradbury, 2007). 
Queries on matters outside their jurisdiction present elected representatives with something of 
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a puzzle: they may choose to take them up regardless, or to redirect them to the elected 
representative at the appropriate level of government. The choices they make have important 
consequences for the extent to which constituency service in multi-level democracies is 
characterised by cooperation between national and regional legislators. Unveiling patterns of 
cooperation across levels of government not only furthers our understanding of how political 
representation operates in multi-level democracies in a way which has gone unappreciated in 
previous research; it may also matter to our evaluation of the quality of constituency service. 
For while provision by multiple representatives may enhance voter choice and stimulate 
competition between them that is beneficial to service in some cases, previous researchers have 
raised concerns. Russell and Bradbury (2007: 114) noted that ‘there is a danger of poor 
accountability if members pursue cases outwith the competence of their own institution, and 
citizens lose sight of who is accountable for what’. Equally, it is questionable how expert 
representatives will be in dealing with misdirected inquiries, how well they will know the 
institutions they are contacting on behalf of their constituents, and how receptive those 
institutions will be in responding to them. This suggests that multi-level democracies may allow 
for a more informed response only if members of national and regional parliaments each 
respond to queries within their jurisdiction and redirect queries outside their jurisdiction. 
 
Previous research in Germany, Canada and the UK has suggested that it is uncommon for 
elected representatives to redirect misdirected constituent inquiries, in particular to 
representatives of other parties (Patzelt, 2007; Franks, 2007; Russell and Bradbury, 2007). 
Generally, however, the lack of a theoretical prospectus for the study of cooperation over 
redirecting misdirected inquiries and the dearth of systematically collected comparative data 
have hampered research in this field. As a result we know little about how and why the extent 
of cross-level cooperation over constituent casework varies. This article seeks to develop the 
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comparative study of cooperation over redirecting constituent inquiries in multi-level 
democracies both theoretically and empirically. 
 
The argument proceeds in five steps. Section two develops a theoretical framework for 
explaining cross-level redirection of misdirected constituent inquiries, combining demand and 
supply factors. Section three presents the data collected as part of the PARTIREP cross-national 
survey of national and regional legislators in seven European multi-level democracies (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). We find that patterns 
of competition are more common than patterns of cooperation, in particular patterns of cross-
party cooperation – though cooperation is not as uncommon as previously anticipated. The key 
findings presented in section four demonstrate how demand and supply factors shape these 
patterns of cooperation over redirection as representatives make rational choices whether or not 
to redirect misdirected inquiries. Section five further theorises and investigates to whom 
inquiries are redirected and why to representatives of particular parties. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of our findings for the study of political representation in multi-
level democracies in general and legislative behaviour in particular. 
 
 
2. Theorising cooperation over redirecting misdirected constituent inquiries  
 
Though their roles are mostly preference roles, the role of ‘good constituency member’ is one 
that many representatives take up and one that many constituents respond to (Searing, 1994; 
Norris, 1997). As a result representatives across a wide range of institutions spend a sizeable 
part of their time dealing with constituents’ inquiries. Good constituency members make 
themselves available to individuals and groups requesting assistance. They organise frequent 
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surgeries and advertise their services, soliciting further cases and seeking to establish a sound 
record of responsiveness (Cain et al., 1987). They do so for electoral reasons as service 
responsiveness of this kind signals their commitment to constituents’ day-to-day concerns, 
builds trust, and wins them electoral support (Eulau and Karps, 1977; Heitshusen et al., 2005; 
but see Norris, 1997). They also provide constituency service for non-electoral reasons, 
including a sense of duty that it is part of their representative responsibilities, and out of a sense 
of worth in being able to help constituents (Searing, 1994). Many representatives also recognise 
that it is through taking up constituents’ problems that they learn first-hand where defects in 
existing legislation and public policy might lie (Norton and Wood, 1993). 
 
However, as an increasing number of polities have developed into multi-level democracies 
citizens frequently direct their inquiries for help to elected representatives irrespective of 
whether their level of government is responsible for the policy or service which is the subject 
of the inquiry (Russell and Bradbury, 2007). This raises the question of how representatives 
across different levels of government will respond. What we currently know suggests that if 
they do not forward misdirected inquiries they will in some way deal with them themselves. 
There is the third option of discarding misdirected inquiries altogether but first, it is 
questionable whether representatives would be prepared to explicitly admit it, and second in 
any case it is not likely given what we know about representatives’ electoral and duty-bound 
motivations for dealing with casework. One existing single country study of constituency 
representation across multi-level jurisdictions suggests that representatives either conduct 
misdirected inquiries themselves or forward and never discard (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2007: 
139-142). Equally, Loewen and MacKenzie’s experimental study (2012) found no differences 
in response rate between inquiries within and outside representatives’ jurisdiction. While 
representatives no doubt do bin some inquiries we assume there will be no systematic pattern 
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to this. Hence, we address the extent to which representatives direct misdirected inquiries to the 
appropriate representative at the other level of government or effectively compete by 
responding to such inquiries themselves. 
  
Previous studies on modes of interaction in the legislative arena have concentrated on 
executive-legislative relations (King, 1976; Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995; Granovetter, 1973; 
Fowler, 2006), contrasting for instance the non-party mode, between the cabinet and MPs 
representing Parliament; the intra-party mode, between MPs of the same party; and the cross-
party mode, between backbenchers of different parties representing shared sectoral interests 
(King, 1976). But multi-level democracies introduce new modes of interaction we know little 
about across different levels of government, and which may vary as parties and party systems 
differ between national and regional levels of government, as well as between regions 
(Deschouwer, 2003).  
 
The article starts from the proposition that patterns of cooperation and competition over 
misdirected casework inquiries are shaped by a combination of demand and supply factors. 
First, in considering demand we need to address the fact that elected representatives face an 
uneven burden in terms of caseload (Johannes, 1980). Their availability may boost demand 
(Cain et al., 1987), but irrespective of their efforts some elected representatives are contacted 
by hundreds of constituents per week, whereas others are hardly contacted at all. Previous 
studies have gauged demand for service responsiveness on the basis of district population. 
Because constituents’ inquiries are frequently about social welfare benefits, housing, and 
immigration (Young et al., 2005), greater demand has also been expected in districts that have 
more need of them, where there is lower income, higher unemployment, and larger non-white 
populations (Johannes, 1980; Freeman and Richardson, 1996; Norris, 1997). However, 
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irrespective of the origins of demand, it may be expected that the higher it is the more 
representatives may be willing to reduce their workload by focusing on inquiries relating to 
their own level of government and redirecting misdirected inquiries. The more inquiries elected 
representatives receive each week, the more they will forward misdirected inquiries to members 
of the legislature concerned. If this proves to be the case it also helps to confirm the assumption 
that representatives make a binary choice between forwarding and dealing with misdirected 
inquiries themselves; if forwarding actually drops as workload increases we would have to 
reconsider whether this reveals discarding inquiries to be a significant form of behaviour related 
to casework overload.    
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the demand representatives face, the more they will forward 
misdirected inquiries to a representative at the other level of government  
 
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, patterns of cooperation and competition emerge as a 
result of supply side factors as shaped by the structure of opportunities. This approach derives 
from recruitment and legislative career studies where the structure of opportunities denotes the 
offices open to ambitious politicians and the rules and customs that define the opportunities for 
winning them (Schlesinger, 1994). In particular, the structure of opportunities is determined by 
positions’ availability, accessibility, and attractiveness (Borchert, 2011). In a similar vein, we 
may theorise that the availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of contact points for 
forwarding misdirected inquiries shapes cooperation over casework. First, the availability of 
contact points denotes the number of targets to which elected representatives may forward 
misdirected inquiries. Second, the accessibility of contact points highlights the fact that some 
contact points are easier to connect to than others. Finally, the idea of attractiveness introduces 
the point that elected representatives may benefit more from forwarding misdirected inquiries 
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to some contact points than to others. While the availability of points of contact can be 
objectively observed, the accessibility and attractiveness of contact points may be expected to 
differ depending on the position and preferences of different elected representatives (Borchert, 
2011, p. 123). 
 
From this prospectus we may derive a number of propositions. First, the likelihood of 
cooperation over casework is shaped by the number of contact points that are available to 
elected representatives for forwarding misdirected inquiries. It is important though to 
distinguish between points of contact within the party and between parties. Previous research 
in the UK noted that forwarding inquiries is much more common among MPs of the same party 
(Russell and Bradbury, 2007). This is consistent with broader research that suggests that party 
organisations have adapted to the multi-level nature of modern democracies (Deschouwer, 
2003; Hopkin, 2003; Fabre, 2008). This suggests that cross-level cooperation in one’s own party 
may be expected to increase with the number of contact points in the party, i.e. the number of 
co-partisans elected to the regional legislature in the case of a national legislator; and the 
number of co-partisans elected to the national legislature in the case of a regional legislator. 
Meanwhile, the propensity of representatives to pass on casework requests to members of other 
parties is expected to decrease as the number of contact points in one’s own party grows. Only 
in the absence of co-partisans do representatives turn to members of other parties. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Representatives are more likely to forward misdirected inquiries to members of 
their own party as the number of contact points in their own party increases. 
Hypothesis 2b: Representatives are more likely to forward misdirected inquiries to members of 




Second, in addressing the accessibility of contact points we need to account for the importance 
of the structure of multi-level government itself. The structure of opportunities approach 
suggests that the scope of shared rule in multi-level democracies will be key in affecting patterns 
of cooperation and competition over misdirected inquiries across different levels of 
government. Shared rule was first identified by Elazar (1987) and measures the extent of shared 
powers over law making, executive control, fiscal control, and constitutional reform (Hooghe 
et al., 2008). When jurisdictions are blurred and responsibilities shared contacts across different 
levels of government are institutionalised and cooperation more frequent. Therefore, we expect 
regional and national legislators’ incentives to pass on misdirected inquiries to grow stronger 
when jurisdictions are shared and contact points more accessible. Though we cannot rule out 
entirely the alternative intuition that elected representatives only pass on inquiries that are 
indisputably outside their jurisdiction and that, as a result, both members of the regional and 
national parliaments will take up the issue when jurisdictions are shared, we believe it will be 
outweighed by the increased accessibility shared rule offers.  
  
Hypothesis 3a: Representatives are more likely to forward misdirected inquiries to co-partisans 
or members of other parties as the scope of shared rule grows. 
 
In addition, the accessibility of contact points reflects elected representatives’ prior career 
trajectories. Not only are there more political offices to run for in multi-level democracies than 
in unitary states but career patterns are also more diverse (see Borchert and Stolz, 2011). Some 
have longstanding careers in one institution; others doggedly move up the hierarchy of offices 
from local to regional and then national levels of government; whilst a minority move 
backwards and forwards between different levels of government (Borchert, 2011). Such career 
trajectories are important because we expect that representatives who have moved to another 
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level of government are likely to have retained at least some good contacts, including over 
casework, among their former colleagues, making cooperation with them more likely.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Representatives who have previously served at the other level of government 
are more likely to forward misdirected inquiries than those representatives who have not. 
 
Finally, cooperation over constituent casework is also expected to be constrained by its 
attractiveness or by what representatives stand to gain from cooperation over redirecting 
constituent inquiries. Elected representatives famously strive for policy, office, and votes 
(Strøm, 1997). Elected representatives will choose to cooperate only when doing so helps them 
obtain their goals, or at least does not prevent them from obtaining them. This leads to three 
propositions. First, we expect that future ambitions not unlike prior career trajectories will shape 
cooperation over casework. For example, Smith (2003) found that US state legislators 
frequently widen their focus of representation when their ambition is to win a seat in Congress. 
In anticipation of serving in another legislature elected representatives will seek to establish 
contacts in their future workplace, including over casework (see Schlesinger, 1994). 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Representatives who seek to serve at the other level of government are more 
likely to forward misdirected inquiries than those representatives who do not. 
 
Second, and more importantly, it has long been established that a reputation of service 
responsiveness wins votes (Cain et al., 1987; Norton and Wood, 1993). By the same reasoning 
representatives most in need of electoral support will not cooperate over redirecting casework, 
but will rather want to claim credit for serving constituents wherever possible (Buck and Cain, 
1990). This notion of personalised electoral competition is shaped by the electoral institutions. 
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This is precisely because the incentives generated by single member plurality differ from those 
fuelled by proportional representation systems. In single-seat districts elected representatives 
bear the sole responsibility of representing the district, whereas in proportional representation 
systems the responsibility is shared by many representatives. With each additional 
representative the costs for voters of monitoring their actions increases, thereby encouraging 
shirking and free-riding on the part of representatives (Bowler and Farrell, 1993). Recent 
research has therefore argued in favour of substituting the simple dichotomy between 
majoritarian and PR electoral formulae with a focus on district magnitude, a more fine-grained 
indicator of electoral incentives. Competition is candidate-centred in small districts and 
becomes more party-centred as district magnitude grows (Wessels, 1999). The time that 
representatives spend doing casework has been demonstrated to decrease in linear fashion as 
districts grow in magnitude (André and Depauw, 2013), a finding confirmed for both national 
and regional representatives serving in multi-level democracies (André et al., 2014). In a similar 
vein, representatives’ propensity to redirect casework inquiries can be expected to become more 
common as district magnitude grows and the electoral competition they face becomes less 
personalised. At the same time, though, what motivates and energises representatives to seek 
such personalised electoral support is their vulnerability to defeat (Norris, 1997). Those 
representatives facing the most competitive constituency contests are least likely to pass up 
opportunities for claiming credit over service responsiveness; and hence they will not cooperate 
in redirecting misdirected constituent inquiries. However modest the bonus to be had over 
casework, it can make the difference between (re)election and defeat (Norton and Wood, 1993). 
 




Hypothesis 4c: Representatives are more likely to forward misdirected inquiries as constituency 
contests grow less competitive. 
 
 Overall, how representatives in multi-level democracies choose to deal with misdirected 
constituent inquiries has plausibly been related to a combination of demand factors and the 
structure of opportunities, in particular the availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of 
points of contact. We now turn to the data that underpins our analysis.  
 
 
3.  Data 
 
Data on cooperation between national and regional legislators over forwarding misdirected 
inquiries have been collected as part of the cross-national PARTIREP survey hosted by the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel. The PARTIREP project surveyed both regional and national legislators in 
seven advanced industrial democracies across Europe that – either through federal design or as 
a result of institutional reform – constitute multi-level arenas of representation. They comprise 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The seven 
differ in particular with regard to shared rule characteristics, as measured by Hooghe et al. 
(2008). The scope of shared rule ranges from low (Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) to 
high (Austria, Belgium, and Germany). In Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland all regional 
legislatures were included.1 The selection of regional legislatures, reported in table 1, balances 
regions from the east and the west in Germany; from the north and the south in Italy; and 
includes autonomous regions in Spain with various regionalist traditions. The regional selection 
further takes into account variation in size and party control. Asymmetries in regionalisation 
result in one more special case: the United Kingdom. MPs representing constituencies in 
12 
 
Scotland and Wales operate in multi-level democracies in a manner that those representing 
constituencies in England do not. 
 
In the PARTIREP survey national legislators were asked, ‘Are there members of your regional 
parliament – in your party and of other parties – with whom you have very good contacts? And 
have they been helpful politically to pass on individual voters’ requests for help on matters that 
are decided in the regional parliament?’ The same questions were then asked of regional 
legislators regarding national legislators. The overall response rate was about one in four, 
totalling 1,737 responses.2 As such the overall response rate is comparable to projects of a 
similar scope (see Bailer 2014).3 The exact number of responses in each country can be found 
in table 1.  
 
Cross-national and partisan differences in response rate make the question of representativeness 
of critical importance. However, Duncan indices of dissimilarity are within an acceptable 
margin (Deschouwer et al., 2014). Deviations from the population amount to no more than 7 
per cent with regard to the level of government, 4 per cent with regard to ruling and opposition 
parties, and 2 per cent with regard to gender. Moreover, differences in responses reflect 
variations in the constitutional structure of the countries, as well as the choice to focus on a 
limited number of regions in Germany, Italy, and Spain. More caution might be advisable for 
those countries with low return rates, in particular Italy and the United Kingdom. Partisan 
differences in response rates are below 10 per cent in Austria, Belgium, and Germany and below 
16 per cent in Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Deviations are typically due 
to the accumulation of differences across a large number of parties; in Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom deviations among the two main parties account for no more than 10 per cent. 
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Therefore weights were added by parliamentary party group in each parliament and data from 
each national/regional level were given an equal weight of 100 in the overall data set. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 further reports for each country in the selection the proportion of national and regional 
legislators who forward misdirected inquiries either to a co-partisan, or to members of other 
parties. As expected, misdirected inquiries are forwarded more frequently to a co-partisan than 
to members of other parties, but the extent of co-partisan forwarding is noteworthy. 62.1 per 
cent of representatives report forwarding inquiries to representatives in their own party at the 
other level of government. This high number adds further evidence to the view that party 
organisations have adapted to the multi-level nature of many modern democracies (Hopkin, 
2003; Fabre, 2008) and have typically sought to manage competition and encourage 
cooperation over casework among their representatives across levels of government.By 
contrast, only 12.8 per cent of representatives pass on misdirected requests to members of other 
parties. Cross-party cross-level cooperation over casework is particularly uncommon in Italy 
and the United Kingdom, thereby corroborating earlier research (Russell and Bradbury, 2007) 
and at the same time demonstrating the United Kingdom to be distinctive. On the other hand, 
cross-party cross-level cooperation is more common in Austria and Germany. There is no clear 
pattern of either regional or national legislators forwarding inquiries to each other more 
frequently. Individual differences outweigh differences between countries and levels of 
government. Overall, because cross-level cooperation over redirecting constituent inquiries 
between representatives within parties is about five times more common than cooperation with 





4. Explaining cooperation over redirecting constituent inquiries 
 
Whether, or not, national and regional legislators forward misdirected inquiries either to a co-
partisan or alternatively to members of other parties are dichotomous indicators best modelled 
using logistic regression. To take into account the hierarchical nature of the data, two-level 
random intercept models will be used, or we risk underestimating the standard errors.4 To 
improve the parameter estimates penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) iterative estimation with a 
second-order linearization is used. The null models demonstrate that the intra-class correlations 
are modest but significant. Key explanatory variables include representatives’ caseload 
(demand) and factors that tap into the structure of opportunities, namely the availability, 
accessibility, and attractiveness of points of contact. The operationalisation, and summary 
statistics, of the independent variables are presented in the appendix. Table 2 reports the 
parameter estimates and measures of model fit. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Representatives across the seven multi-level democracies face important differences in 
caseload that shape their propensity to forward misdirected inquiries. Constituent inquiries are 
most numerous in Spain and the United Kingdom. The average British or Spanish legislator 
deals with 35 to 40 requests for assistance per week, whereas Swiss legislators hardly get any. 
Italian and Belgian legislators deal with 16 to 18 inquiries per week, while Austrian and German 
legislators get about half as many. The relative sizes of caseloads appear to correspond to what 
we might have expected from the previous comparative literature on constituency service (see 
Norton and Wood, 1993; Patzelt, 2007; Lundberg, 2007). However, individual-level differences 
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outweigh country-level differences. In any single country some representatives report receiving 
over 50 inquiries per week, whereas others do not receive any. We did indeed find that this 
uneven burden generates incentives for representatives to forward misdirected inquiries, in 
particular for those facing hefty caseloads. Table 2 firmly supports hypothesis 1. As caseloads 
grow, regional and national legislators increasingly seek to offload at least part of the work by 
passing on misdirected inquiries. The data does not support an alternative idea that 
representatives’ propensity to redirect cases to co-partisans and non-partisans alike is a 
curvilinear function of their caseload, which might suggest that representatives start to discard 
inquiries as workload increases. They first and foremost pass on misdirected inquiries to 
members of their own party at the other level of government. The likelihood of redirecting 
inquiries to a co-partisan increases by 8 per cent when the number of casework requests 
increases from 2 to 20 – i.e. the interquartile difference.5 However, caseloads do not affect 
cross-party cooperation in the same manner – only if a co-partisan is not available do 
representatives forward misdirected inquiries to another party. The interquartile difference 
(from 2 to 20 inquiries per week) increases the likelihood of forwarding inquiries to members 
of other parties merely by 2 per cent. The latter effect is smaller in size and significant only at 
the 90 per cent level.   
 
More importantly, patterns of cooperation, and competition, across different levels of 
government are shaped by the institutionally defined structure of opportunities. First, table 2 
underlines the importance of the availability of contact points. The more points of contact that 
are available, the more frequently misdirected inquiries are forwarded. In particular the more 
contact points representatives have in their own party, the more likely they are to forward 
misdirected inquiries to a co-partisan and the less likely they are to pass on inquiries to members 
of other parties, confirming hypotheses 2a and b. Increasing the number of contact points from 
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1 to 20 raises the likelihood of cross-level cooperation over casework among co-partisans by 
15 per cent. By contrast, a similar increase in the number of contact points in representatives’ 
own party reduces the likelihood that inquiries are forwarded to members of other parties by 6 
per cent. The more contact points representatives have in their own party at the other level of 
government, the less likely they are to pass on misdirected inquiries to members of other parties. 
 
Second, the data suggest that the more accessible contact points are the more likely 
representatives are to forward inquiries to co-partisans or members of other parties. On the one 
hand, where shared rule characterizes the structure of government, cooperation across different 
levels of government is more common – hard-wiring particular connections by their very 
frequency. As a result misdirected inquiries are forwarded more frequently, confirming 
hypothesis 2. The alternative suggestion was that only inquiries that are indisputably outside 
representatives’ jurisdictions will be forwarded, but the evidence does not support this 
contention. Shared rule increases the probability of forwarding constituent queries both to a co-
partisan (model 1) and to members of other parties (model 2). The effects are both statistically 
significant and substantively large. In conditions of maximum shared rule the predicted 
probability of a representative forwarding misdirected inquiries to a co-partisan is 20 per cent 
greater than in conditions of minimum shared rule; the predicted probability of a representative 
forwarding inquiries to members of other parties 10 per cent greater. 
 
At the same time, prior career trajectories also affect the accessibility of cooperation among 
former colleagues. However, while hypothesis 3a is strongly confirmed hypothesis 3b is only 
partially confirmed. National legislators who previously served in the regional legislature retain 
good contacts with at least some of their former colleagues in other parties. But intriguingly 
while they forward misdirected inquiries to members of other parties, more often than national 
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legislators who have not served in the regional legislature, they do not forward misdirected 
constituent inquiries more often to co-partisans. Equally, regional legislators who previously 
served in the national legislature – though they are fewer – similarly cooperate more often over 
casework with members of other parties than regional legislators who haven’t, but do not 
cooperate more often with co-partisans. Previous experience markedly increases the likelihood 
of redirecting casework requests to members of another party by 4 per cent, but does not add to 
explaining intra-party cooperation. It could be argued, of course, that elected representatives 
who have served at the other level of government have become expert in dealing with inquiries 
relevant to it and therefore are inclined to conduct misdirected inquiries themselves. But the 
data certainly do not support this idea of a negative relation. 
 
Third, we can confirm that the attractiveness of contact points also shapes cross-level 
cooperation. Depending on at which level of government representatives want to be at some 
point in the future, cross-level cooperation is more or less attractive to them. Regional 
legislators who seek to serve in the national legislature in the future are more likely to forward 
misdirected inquiries to their future colleagues in other parties, as are national legislators who 
seek to serve in one of the regional legislatures. The likelihood of forwarding misdirected 
requests is 8 per cent higher for representatives who see their future at the other level of 
government than for those who do not. However, again hypothesis 4a is only partially 
corroborated. We have already established that representatives know co-partisans quite well, 
even at the other level of government; and know to whom to forward misdirected inquiries. 
They frequently meet at party conferences and local party meetings. While prior career 
trajectories and future ambitions may shape cross-party cooperation in multi-level democracies, 




Finally, the attractiveness of cooperation over casework is shaped by representatives’ electoral 
reasons for engaging in constituency service. However, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, 
we do not find support for hypothesis 4b, that is, for patterns of cooperation to be shaped by the 
candidate-centred or party-centred nature of electoral competition. The probability of cross-
level cooperation over casework neither increases, nor decreases as a result of district 
magnitude.6 On the other hand, electoral competitiveness does affect individual representatives’ 
decision to forward misdirected inquiries, confirming hypothesis 4c. The more competitive the 
race an individual representative is in, the more reluctant he or she is to forward misdirected 
inquiries to members of other parties, though not to a co-partisan. Representatives who feel that 
their re-election can go either way are 7 per cent less likely to cooperate over casework with 
colleagues from rival parties. They prefer to claim sole credit for their service responsiveness 
when the electoral bonus to be had from constituency service can make the difference between 
re-election and defeat. 
 
 
5. Explaining with whom cooperation over misdirected constituent inquiries occurs 
 
We know that constituent inquiries are infrequently redirected to members of other parties at 
the other level of government but if they are, to which party are they forwarded? In order to 
address the question, a stacked data matrix is used. In this data matrix each representative has 
multiple lines, one for each party in the legislature to which (s)he may, or may not, pass on 
inquiries. Needless to say, only representatives who pass on misdirected inquiries to members 
of other parties are included. Looking at the (in)frequency of cross-level cooperation in the 
seven multi-level democracies five points are particularly striking. First, cross-level 
cooperation over casework occurs between the main party families, between liberals, social 
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democrats, and Christian democrats. Not only are these parties represented in most of the 
legislatures in the selection, they also cooperate in a higher proportion of the cases where they 
are represented. Figure 1 illustrates that social democrats, for instance, forward inquiries to 
Christian democrats in up to 60.5 per cent of the cases where both parties are represented in the 
legislature (if they forward inquiries at all). Christian democrats cooperate with liberals in 51.4 
per cent of cases where both parties are represented and with social democrats in 36.3 per cent. 
Second, Conservatives are represented in but a handful of legislatures, but where they are, they 
tend to cooperate with social democrats, Christian democrats, and liberals. Third, Greens 
cooperate most often with social democrats and Christian democrats – although they are few in 
number and caution is advisable in interpreting these findings. Fourth, regionalist parties are a 
diverse family, but they more often forward misdirected inquiries to social democrats and 
Christian democrats. Fifth, few representatives cooperate with the far right outside Austria, 
where the FPÖ has not been side-lined as other far right parties have been. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In seeking to explain the party to which misdirected inquiries are forwarded, we argue that the 
structure of opportunities again is key. The availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of 
particular points of contact – that is, representatives in parties – govern the choices 
representatives make. First, it may be expected that the more representatives there are available 
in a particular party, the more likely representatives are to forward inquiries to this party. In 
other words, the larger a party is, the more members there are to forward inquiries to and the 




Hypothesis 5: The likelihood that representatives forward misdirected inquiries to members of 
a particular party increases with that party’s size. 
 
Second, some points of contact are more accessible than others. In particular, ideological 
proximity leads to cooperation between the two parties being hard-wired into their daily 
operations. Social networks of any kind, including friendship, work, or marriage, occur at a 
higher rate among ‘similar’ people in terms of age, education, or race (for an overview of this 
homophily principle see McPherson et al., 2001). Even if inquiries from constituents are 
frequently devoid of ideology (see Norton and Wood, 1993), good contacts will be formed 
among elected representatives who share an outlook on society, its main challenges, and the 
way ahead. Faced with misdirected inquiries, they will choose to forward them to a party that 
is ideologically close. For instance, previous research has demonstrated the importance of 
ideological proximity to bill co-sponsorship (Talbert and Potoski, 2002; Crisp et al., 2004). But 
even over casework that is non-ideological, cooperation is more likely among representatives 
of adjacent parties: representatives will be reluctant to pass on queries from particular 
subconstituencies to members of other parties that may look unfavourably on them. They are 
equally reluctant to present bitter adversaries with an electoral bonus however uncertain. In this 
sense, ideological proximity can be understood to affect not only the accessibility of points of 
contact, but also to translate into their attractiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood that representatives forward misdirected inquiries to members of 
a particular party increases the closer that party is in ideological space. 
 
Finally, cooperation over forwarding inquiries to representatives from one party may be more 
attractive than cooperation with another. A key consideration is asymmetries in government 
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participation in multi-level democracies – parties that govern in one region, but not at the central 
level, for instance – which result in differences in access to government. Government access is 
frequently critical to the redress of grievances (see Ashworth and Mesquita, 2006; Norton, 
1982). For this reason, representatives –in particular those whose own party is in opposition– 
are likely to choose to forward misdirected inquiries to ruling parties (at the relevant level of 
government) and obtain for their constituents enhanced access at the other level of government. 
By contrast, there are parties, in particular on the far right, with whom cooperation may be 
costly for representatives (for a similar argument with regard to coalition formation, see Strøm 
et al., 1994). Representatives can be expected not to forward inquiries to representatives of far 
right parties if doing so will result in public disapproval and will jeopardise their relations with 
other parties. For example, Belgian political parties agreed in 1992 to exclude Vlaams Belang 
from all kinds of cooperation.  
 
Hypothesis 7a: The likelihood that representatives forward misdirected inquiries to members 
from a particular party increases if that party is in government. 
Hypothesis 7b: The likelihood that representatives forward misdirected inquiries to members 
from a particular party decreases if that party is a far right party. 
 
In conducting our analysis, again whether or not representatives forward inquiries to members 
of a particular party can be treated as a dichotomous variable. As a result logistic regression is 
used on the stacked data matrix. Analogous to the first analysis, two-level random intercept 
models are used as party contacts are nested within representatives. The likelihood of inquiries 
being redirected is then explained by including characteristics of the party with whom contacts 
may be formed in these regression analyses. These comprise its size, ideological proximity, 
whether it is part of the government, and whether it is a far right party. The operationalisation 
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and summary statistics of these variables are reported in the appendix. The estimated regression 
coefficients and robust standard errors are presented in table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results show that opportunity structures also shape representatives’ choices of the parties 
to whom they forward misdirected inquiries. First, cooperation over casework is determined by 
the availability of points of contact. Representatives are more likely to forward inquiries to 
members of larger parties than to those of smaller parties, confirming hypothesis 5. Inquiries 
may be passed on to any representative in the party and the likelihood of contacts being formed 
with the party therefore increases with each additional representative in the party. The 
probability of inquiries being forwarded increases by about 14 per cent when the number of 
seats the party holds increases from 2 to 34 – i.e. the interquartile difference.  
 
Second, the accessibility of points of contact affects representatives’ choice of the parties to 
whom they are prepared to redirect casework. The likelihood that representatives cooperate 
over casework with representatives of a particular party is constrained by the ideological 
distance between the two parties. Social networks of any kind are more likely to be formed 
among the likeminded and contacts among representatives are no different. Model 3 
demonstrates that national and regional legislators are more likely to cooperate over casework 
with legislators from the parties that are close to them on the left-right continuum. The further 
the party is removed from their own position, the less likely they are to pass on misdirected 
constituent queries to them. The effect is strong: a one-point difference on the left-right scale 
decreases the likelihood of cooperation by 9 per cent; a three-point difference by 21 per cent; 
and a five-point difference by more than 31 per cent. Because of missing data on the party 
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positions the number of cases is reduced in this model. But model 4 confirms that the reduction 
of cases does not alter, but rather corroborates our findings. Models 3 and 4 report similar 
effects for all variables, irrespective of the inclusion of ideological proximity in the models. We 
can therefore be confident that ideological distance constrains cooperation over casework. 
 
Third, representatives’ decisions are based on the attractiveness of contact points. 
Representatives stand to benefit more from cooperating with representatives from a party in 
government. As a result they are almost three times more likely to forward misdirected inquiries 
to representatives from a party in government than to an opposition party, confirming 
hypothesis 7a. Redress of grievances is frequently only within the grasp of those who have 
privileged access to the government. By contrast, inquiries are not redirected to far right parties 
any less frequently than to members of other parties. Cooperation is particularly common with 
the Austrian FPÖ, but even in the other countries the lower frequency of cooperation with far 
right parties does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Of course, their 
ideological distance to parties of the far right sufficiently explains many representatives’ lower 
propensity to cooperate with them. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Elected representatives across the globe are asked to assist constituents in dealing with public 
authorities and spend considerable time dealing with their inquiries. Casework is a key 
component of their representative function. Multi-level democracies come with the promise of 
increased service responsiveness – provided that members of national and regional parliaments 
each respond to queries within their jurisdiction and redirect queries outside their jurisdiction. 
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The evidence presented here from seven European multi-level democracies suggests that 
patterns of competition are more common than patterns of cooperation over casework. Six in 
ten representatives pass on misdirected constituent inquiries to members of their own party; 
whereas only one in eight forwards queries to members of other parties. We find that a 
theoretical approach that emphasises a combination of demand and supply factors, in particular 
a structure of opportunities, and hypothesises how representatives rationally respond to those 
factors, goes a long way to explaining how and why cross-level cooperation over redirecting 
constituent inquiries then varies.  
 
Representatives are most likely to forward inquiries when on the one hand there is a real need 
to effectively deal with hefty caseloads that can quickly deplete a representative’s resources; 
and on the other hand when there are plenty of contact points available, particularly of 
representatives within their own party. Forwarding also increases when representatives’ 
strategic preferences coalesce with the accessibility and attractiveness of those contact points.  
This is particularly so as the scope of shared rule grows; where representatives’ previous 
experience includes serving at the other level of government or where they aspire to do so in 
the future with a key effect on co-operation with representatives of other parties. On the other 
hand the more electorally competitive constituency contests are the less likely representatives 
are to forward misdirected inquiries. The availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of contact 
points further indicate which particular party representatives inquiries will be forwarded to: in 
particular to representatives of large parties, parties that are ideologically close, and parties in 
government.  
 
The analysis confirms the underlying strong inclination for representatives to provide 
constituency service and to deal with even misdirected constituent inquiries in the context of 
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multi-level government. This sustains the need to address concerns over the quality of 
constituency service in such systems, notably over blurred lines of accountability and over the 
effectiveness of constituency service. That said, the results indicate that there has been a 
significant level of intra-party adaptation which has facilitated forwarding to co-partisans in a 
majority of cases, reflecting broader observations within the party adaptation research literature 
of efficient and effective state-wide party adaptations to multi-level government.  Because of 
party competition even across levels of government one has to be realistic about just how much 
co-operation over forwarding misdirected inquiries one should expect between representatives 
of different parties. Nevertheless, we can see that institutional reformers can have an impact 
even on this by developing multi-level government with higher levels of shared rule, and by 
encouraging flexible approaches to career development, which facilitate representatives 
moving between levels of government.   
  
This article has addressed the understudied issue of interactions between representatives across 
different levels of government in multi-level democracies (Granovetter, 1973; Fowler, 2006). 
It provides a theoretical prospectus for further inquiry into the extent of cross-level cooperation 
over redirecting constituent inquiries and explaining how and why cooperation varies. This 
research agenda needs to be complemented by qualitative research as it is clear that as well as 
seeking to measure the extent of co-operation and competition over misdirected casework we 
need to problematise what co-operation and competition mean. Earlier research on Scotland 
and Wales in the UK suggested the possibility of large variation in behaviours including: joint 
representative offices which facilitate immediate redirection of inquiries; forwarding that may 
mean copying the other representative in while still dealing with the inquiry; harmonious 
agreement between representatives at each level to each deal with whatever inquiries that came 
their way; or even proactive casework competition seeking to attract constituents away from 
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the representative at the other level (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2007, Bradbury 2007). Equally, 
recent interviews in Belgium suggest that some parties have strict divisions of jurisdiction to 
prevent turf wars among their representatives. “Some are very protective of the matters they 
deal with”, one Belgian national legislator told us. “Especially rookies get very nervous when 
another legislator fails to pass on inquiries within their assigned jurisdiction.”7  
 
Qualitative and experimental methods could also explore what kind of constituent requests are 
being forwarded. Are they requests that require further fact-finding or intervention, and do 
representatives respond to simple inquiries themselves? Are they requests that promise little 
electoral gain, or even a public backlash? Are they requests for something that representatives 
are unable to, or must not, obtain for them? And do constituents receive a more informed answer 
as a result? Future research should also focus on the impact of the structure of opportunities on 
other forms of cross-level cooperation. Notably, studies of representation, and studies of 
legislative behaviour in particular, frequently fail to account for the multi-level nature of a great 
number of polities that representatives work in. In this ‘multi-level’ game, we should take 
seriously the assumption that actions and strategies in one arena affect ‘the way the game is 
played’ in another arena (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 248). In pursuing this broader research agenda we 
may hope to further our understanding of how multi-level democracies shape, and reshape, 
patterns of representation. 
 
1  Political parties are absent from the cantonal legislature of Appenzell-Innerrhoden; it was 
not included for this reason. 
2  Between March 2009 and January 2012, all members of the selected legislatures were 







introductory letter and e-mail inviting them to participate by web-based survey. They further 
received at least two online reminders (excluding ‘hard’ refusals) and the option was offered 
to them to fill out a print questionnaire or to be interviewed. A final invitation was by 
telephone in many countries. 
3  Response rates ranged from 18 to 85 per cent in the EPRG project 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/EPRG); from 4 to 43 per cent in the 
PIREDEU project (www.piredeu.eu); and from 18 to 66 per cent of parliamentary candidates 
in the CCS project (www.comparativecandidates.org). Studies among congressional 
candidates obtained response rates approaching one in three (www.votesmart.org and 
ces.iga.ucdavis.edu). 
4  To justify the use of multi-level analysis, the two-level models presented in table 2 were 
tested against single-level models using likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis that the 
variance at the parliament-level does not differ from zero could be rejected at the one per 
cent level. 
5  To compute predicted probabilities, continuous variables are set to their mean values and 
dichotomous variables are fixed at zero. 
6  Replacing district magnitude by the dichotomous indicator contrasting single-member 
plurality system to PR systems does not alter this conclusion. 
7  Interviews with members of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives were conducted within 
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